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How can we understand the interaction between the social network topology of a popula-
tion and the patterns of group aﬃliation in that population? Each aspect inﬂuences the
other: social networks provide the conduits via which groups recruit new members and
groups provide the context in which new social ties are formed. Given that the resources
of individuals are ﬁnite, groups can be considered to compete with one another for the
time and energy of their members. Such competition is likely to have an impact on the
way in which social structure and group aﬃliation co-evolve. While many social simula-
tion models exhibit group formation as a part of their behaviour (e.g., opinion clusters
or converged cultures), models that explicitly focus on group aﬃliation are less common.
We describe and explore the behaviour of a model in which, distinct from most current
models, individual nodes can belong to multiple groups simultaneously. By varying the
capacity of individuals to belong to groups, and the costs associated with group mem-
bership, we explore the eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of competition on population structure
and group dynamics.
Keywords: Social networks; group aﬃliation; simulation.
1. Introduction
Groups are an important social phenomenon, representing an intermediate level of
organization between individuals and society as a whole. Many types of groups can
be identiﬁed, centered around professional, recreational, social, political, charitable
and other interests. Groups have aims, often related to furthering the interests of
their members in a way that could not be achieved by individual members acting
alone. For example, groups may provide their members with company or social
status, or provide a united voice arguing for political change, collective bargain-
ing or fund-raising. Some types of groups, such as religious or political groups,
may be exclusive, in that membership in one group precludes membership in other
groups of that type, while others are non-exclusive: a single individual may be a
member of multiple recreational or charitable groups, for example. The pattern of
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group aﬃliation across a population changes over time as new groups are formed,
individuals join and leave existing groups and old groups die away.
Groups and social networks share a reﬂexive relationship. Groups grow via the
recruitment of new members through existing social contacts [39]. At the same
time, groups act as a foci for the formation of new social ties, as group activities
bring previously unknown people into contact [13]. The dynamics of groups are
therefore an emergent property of decisions made by individuals about both their
aﬃliations and their social contacts. One general constraint on group membership
is that aﬃliation with a group tends to involve the commitment of time and energy
to events associated with that group (e.g., meetings, fund-raising, or engaging in
social activities) [25]. Therefore, there is a limit on the number of groups with which
a single individual can be actively involved. As a result, groups must compete with
one another for the time and resources of their potential members [27, 28, 41].
There are several reasons then to be interested in the dynamics of groups. An
understanding of group level processes, and how they emerge from and inﬂuence the
behavior of individuals, is a critical part of understanding social order. Is it possible
to predict or explain the success or failure of groups formed with a particular
social or political agenda? How do organizations adapt and change to changing
environmental conditions? How can such an understanding inform strategies of
groups seeking to survive and thrive in a complex environment? The relevance
of group dynamics to current issues ranges from, for example, the emergence of
environmental NGOs amidst the changing social and political landscape of China
[43] to the recent surge of right wing extremist and militant groups in the US [40].
Despite the presence of group level behavior in several diﬀerent categories of
social simulation model, there are few models that focus explicitly on how the
dynamics of group aﬃliation and social structure co-evolve. Most existing mod-
els that involve group formation correspond to the scenario in which groups are
exclusive. In this paper, we explore the implications of relaxing this constraint and
allowing individuals to belong to multiple groups simultaneously. We ﬁrst review
theoretical background on group aﬃliation and existing models that involve group
level dynamics. We then describe a minimal non-exclusive group (NEG) model of
a system in which group aﬃliation and social structure co-evolve and use it to
investigate the eﬀect that varying the intensity of competition has on population
structure and group dynamics. Finally, we summarize our observations and discuss
future directions in which the NEG model could be developed.
2. Theoretical Basis: Sociological Perspectives on Social Groups
Groups are integral to the structure and functioning of complex societies, facilitat-
ing the organization of individuals with heterogeneous and specialized needs and
skills. Groups are similarly important to the individuals within a complex society,
providing the context in which they ﬁnd “work and recreation, rewards and penal-
ties, struggle and mutual aid” [23]. Interest in the dynamics of groups stretches back
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at least as far as Simmel, who maintained that the association among individuals
via social groups constituted the very fabric of society [38]. He proposed that the
transition from pre-modern to modern society had been characterized by a transfor-
mation in the geometry of social structure. Aﬃliations in pre-modern society were
concentric: an individual owed allegiance to family, town and religion in a series
of increasingly large social circles. By contrast, modern society is characterized by
an increase in choices of aﬃliation and an unshackling of the bonds between them;
each individual stands at the center of a set of partially overlapping social circles,
the unique intersection of which contributes to their self-deﬁnition [33]. The pattern
of group aﬃliations across society will therefore be complex and overlapping.
Social groups in modern societies take a broad range of forms, from families
and clubs to unions and religions. One common classiﬁcation made by sociologists
is to distinguish between primary and secondary groups. In the former category
are small groups in which all members have direct contact with one another, such
as families, teams and friendship groups. In contrast, secondary groups are larger
and may be geographically dispersed, with more complex internal structure [10, 23].
Unlike primary groups, in which people can have little choice of aﬃliation, secondary
groups are typically freely joined and left by individuals, with little inﬂuence from
government or market forces. The members of a secondary group are typically
united by their pursuit of a common interest or goal, which may range from their
participation in a particular sport through to a campaign to elect a particular
politician. When the goal is ﬁnite, as in the latter case, groups may succeed or fail
in their aims and understanding the factors that contribute to the success of groups
is an important challenge [9].
It has been argued that voluntary, interest-focused groups may be an important
factor inﬂuencing societal integration [3]. Such groups have the potential to act as
bridges across demographic categories by providing opportunities for interaction
that would otherwise be absent [34, 35]. Thus, they can help to reduce societal
cleavages that may result in conﬂict or inequality, bringing together individuals
of disparate social backgrounds according to shared interests or goals. However,
this view has been challenged by the observation that many voluntary associations
are homogeneous and therefore reinforce existing societal divisions [26]. Individuals
associated with groups can often be distinguished by such demographic variables
as their sex, age, race, profession and educational background. One cause of this
is homophily — the principle that like attracts like. Given a choice, people are
widely observed to preferentially interact with others with whom they share similar
characteristics [26]. When most network ties are between similar individuals, and
most group recruitment occurs via network ties, the result is homogeneous groups.
Not only may this homogeneity have a negative impact on societal integration, it
may also be harmful to the interests of the groups: research on social movements
indicate that a movement’s eﬃcacy (it’s ability to achieve its aims) is dependent
on the diverse skills and resources that its members can call upon. Such skills and
resources are likely to be maximized among heterogeneous groups [30].
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Understanding the factors that inﬂuence an individual’s decision to join or leave
groups is a challenge that has received considerable attention [15, 24, 26, 27, 36, 39].
One theme that has emerged is the importance of social context for an individual’s
choices of group aﬃliation. While it is conceivable that individuals make indepen-
dent decisions about their aﬃliations on the basis of their personal beliefs and
values, evidence suggests that an individual’s social context plays an important
(perhaps dominating) role. Given the strong coupling between social structure and
group aﬃliation, simulation modelling is an appropriate methodology to help better
understand the dynamics of this complex relationship. In the following section, we
review the existing models that come closest to capturing this relationship, before
setting out the assumptions that governed the design of our own model.
3. Existing Models: Opinions, Cultures and Groups
A variety of existing models capture aspects of the group formation process in which
we are interested. While group formation per se was not necessarily the primary
focus of these models, they each exhibit aﬃliation dynamics and their behavior can
be described in terms of clusters of individuals united by some shared property.
More general reviews of these models may be found in recent review papers (e.g.,
[6]). Here, we focus on the manner in which these models capture the interaction
between group aﬃliation and social evolution, and the extent to which they exhibit
inter-group competition.
3.1. Opinion dynamics
One important class of models studies the emergence of agreement in groups of peo-
ple holding diverse opinions on some issue [11, 17]. The set of opinions available to
an individual may represent a binary choice (e.g., voting yes or no in a referendum),
a choice among discrete options (e.g., alignment to one particular religion), or the
choice of a value on a continuum (e.g., where a more nuanced range of views are
possible). Various rules for opinion change have been proposed, from simple ‘voting’
or ‘majority rules’ models, where individuals adopt the opinion of one or more of
their neighbors, through to ‘bounded conﬁdence’ models, in which individuals are
represented by both a continuous opinion and an uncertainty level and inﬂuence
one another according to the extent that their opinion regions overlap.
A primary motivation for opinion dynamics models is to understand the con-
ditions under which a single opinion will prevail and the conditions that will lead
to two (or more) opinions co-existing in a population. Opinions are exclusive —
an individual may only hold one opinion on a particular topic at a time. Hence,
competition between opinions is intrinsic to the model: one opinion’s gain of an
adherent is another opinion’s loss. Coevolutionary opinion dynamics models have
also been explored, in which agreement between individuals is used as the basis for
social tie creation [1, 18, 21, 22]. Such homophilous rewiring, if rapid with respect to
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the rate of state update, leads to the emergence of disconnected clusters of nodes,
each consisting of a single opinion.
3.2. Cultural evolution
The paradigmatic model of cultural evolution was proposed by Axelrod [2]. He
began with the challenge of explaining why, if individuals tend to become more
similar over time, we are left with any diversity at all. In Axelrod’s model, an indi-
vidual’s culture is deﬁned as a vector of discrete-valued traits. Individuals interact
if they share suﬃcient cultural traits and adopt their neighbors’ trait values. Over
time, interactions between individuals lead to regions of cultural convergence sep-
arated by cultural boundaries (i.e., neighboring sites who share no cultural traits
and hence do not interact). Axelrod found that the number of stable cultures varied
with the number of cultural features, and the number of possible traits per feature.
There is some overlap between models of opinion formation and cultural evolution,
the primary distinction being that opinions are typically modeled as scalar vari-
ables, while cultures are modelled as vectors of traits. Axelrod’s model has also
been extended to include structural change, with individuals able to rewire social
ties away from culturally dissonant neighbors [7]. In this model, one possible out-
come is for the population to organise into disconnected and culturally homogeneous
clusters, similar to those observed in coevolutionary opinion dynamics models.
3.3. Group aﬃliation
Several recent papers have considered group aﬃliation more directly. A series of
models have been proposed based on tag-related mechanisms that facilitate the
emergence of groups of cooperating individuals [12]. This class of models range
from abstract resource-gathering simulations, in which agents with diverse resource-
gathering skills form into complementary groups, through to decentralized comput-
ing simulations, in which nodes form into cooperative groups that isolate and avoid
exploitation by defectors. In these models group aﬃliation is an implicit concept
arising from the patterns of interaction between individual agents.
A more explicit depiction of group aﬃliation is used in a model of church mem-
bership designed to investigate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent membership strate-
gies on church survival [8]. In this model, members allocate their time and income
between church and other secular activities according to a utility function. Churches
are diﬀerentiated by the cost they demand of their followers, and the extent to which
they proscribe participation in secular activities. The simulations found that the
most liberal churches (proscribing no or few activities) survived longest, but that,
for stricter churches, their was no signiﬁcant relationship between the number of
activities proscribed and the consequent reduction in lifespan. While church mem-
bership is exclusive in this model, individuals can participate in multiple secular
activities, and competition exists among churches, and also between churches and
secular activities.
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4. Non-Exclusive Group Model: Assumptions
Each of the models above involve some notion of groups, whether they be clus-
ters of opinion, regions of homogeneous culture, or actual organizations. However,
aﬃliation diﬀers from both opinion and culture in several pertinent ways: opin-
ion dynamics models typically consider a single issue, about which individuals
may express one of two or more opinions (the model described in Ref. 19 is a
notable exception, looking at interactions between two issues). In reality, individ-
uals belong to multiple groups simultaneously. The trait vector of the cultural
models comes closer to reﬂecting this scenario; however, the inability of an individ-
ual to increase or decrease the number of traits they exhibit during a simulation
is limiting. Furthermore, the phenomenon of cultural convergence, where a group
of individuals come to share identical trait vectors, has no meaningful analogy in
the context of group aﬃliation. In designing the NEG model, we have drawn upon
existing models where relevant, but removed the assumption of exclusive group
membership.
Two broadly contrasting approaches to modeling social networks can be dis-
tinguished [4]. The ﬁrst, from the perspective of social scientists, emphasizes the
importance of the individual node, the nuances of its relationships with other nodes
and the eﬀect that this has on its actions. The second, from the perspective of
physical scientists, emphasizes the network as an aggregate, seeking to explain how
particular network structures might explain, or be explained by, particular types of
interaction between individual nodes. The NEG model falls in the latter class. We
do not explicitly model the utility functions that result in individual agents making
the decisions they do, but rather assume that, given a particular context, a given
action will be performed at a particular rate across the entire population.
A further distinction may be made between models that aim to be predictive and
those whose aim is understanding [14]. The NEG model again falls into the latter
class; we aim to better understand the interaction between social structure and
group dynamics, without attempting to make predictions about a particular system.
By translating a set of assumptions (derived from literature) into a simulation
model, we are able to explore their consequences. The key assumptions embodied
in the NEG model are as follows:
• Individuals can be located in sociodemographic space according to variables such
as their age, gender, social class and geographic location [27, 42].
• Individuals wish to join groups; while not modeled explicitly, we assume that
groups provide access to resources that would otherwise be unavailable [32]; fur-
thermore, individuals wish to participate in groups to the maximum extent that
their available time and energy allow.
• Individuals prefer to associate with others who are similar to themselves, where
similarity is deﬁned in terms of distance in sociodemographic space [26].
• Social ties are the primary avenue of group recruitment [24].
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• Groups are an important foci for the formation of new social ties between indi-
viduals [39]; however, social ties may also form between ‘strangers’ [20].
In addition, we make several pragmatic assumptions that we recognize as over-
simpliﬁcations of real systems, but that allow us to achieve a parsimonious model:
• New groups are initiated stochastically by individuals.
• Groups of individuals have goals that are, in some fashion, dependent on the
continuing investment of time and energy by their members; therefore the success
of a group will depend on its ability to attract new members and retain existing
members.
• From the perspective of an individual, groups are distinguished only by the
sociodemographic composition of their members and are otherwise equivalent
and interchangeable with respect to the beneﬁts they provide.
By temporarily setting aside considerations of individual utility and group eﬃ-
cacy, we can focus more clearly on the eﬀect that competition has on the interaction
between group dynamics and social structure. The following section translates these
assumptions into a simulation model. In the ﬁnal section of the paper, we discuss
some of the limitations that arise from the assumptions made here, and how they
could be mitigated in future models.
5. Non-Exclusive Group Model: Description
We consider a network of n nodes and m undirected edges, representing individuals
and the social ties between them. Each node i has a trait vector of dimension d,
representing that individual’s location in social space [42], a list of aﬃliated groups,
and a ‘time and energy’ (TAE) capacity. Trait values are bounded between zero and
one and are uniformly distributed. The social distance between two individuals is
deﬁned as the Euclidean distance between their trait vectors.
Each group has a TAE cost associated with being a member. The number of
groups with which a node can be aﬃliated is limited by its TAE capacity. For
example, a node with TAE capacity of two could be simultaneously aﬃliated with
two groups with TAE cost of one, or one group with TAE cost of two. The social
distance between an individual i and a group g is deﬁned as the mean social distance
between i and the set of i’s neighbors belonging to g.
Two classes of process act on the network. The ﬁrst class aﬀects social structure:
edges may be rewired either to nodes sharing a common state, or at random. The
second class aﬀects group aﬃliation: nodes may either initiate a new group, or be
recruited to an existing group by one of their network neighbors. During each time-
step of a simulation run, one of the four processes below is chosen to occur with a
probability proportion to the rates indicated:
(1) Group-oriented rewiring (rate mp) — Choose a random edge (i, j); Choose a
random node k that has at least one shared group aﬃliation with i, but to
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which i is not currently connected. Delete the edge (i, j) and add the new
edge (i, k).
(2) Group recruitment (rate mq) — Choose a random edge (i, j); Choose one of
i’s groups and attempt to recruit j to that group (if not already a member). If
joining the group would cause j to exceed their TAE capacity, j either leaves
one or more of their current groups, or refuses the recruitment attempt (see
below).
(3) Group initiation (rate nr) — Choose a random node i; create a new group and
aﬃliate i with it. If initiating the group causes i to exceed their TAE capacity,
i leaves one or more of their current groups (see below).
(4) Random rewiring (rate mw) — Choose a random edge (i, j); Choose a random
node k to which i is not currently connected. Delete the edge (i, j) and add the
new edge (i, k).
As mentioned above, groups have a TAE cost associated with membership and
an individual node’s aﬃliations are limited by its TAE capacity. A node initiating
a new group will always leave existing groups to make time for the new group. In
contrast, a node being recruited to a new group will either leave existing groups,
or refuse the recruitment attempt, depending on which set of groups it identiﬁes
most strongly with (i.e., is closest to in sociodemographic space). When a node
exceeds its TAE capacity, it considers its social distance from each of its current
groups and the new group it is to join. It then leaves groups in order of increas-
ing social distance until either suﬃcient TAE capacity has been made available
to join the new group, or the new group has been rejected. Nodes are able to
rejoin groups that they have left if they are invited again at some point in the
future.
6. Results
For the simulations reported in this paper, parameters governing the size and den-
sity of the network and the rates of each process were ﬁxed: {n = 200;m = 600;
d = 1; p = 1.0; q = 0.1; r = 0.01;w = 0.01}. The eﬀect that varying these param-
eters has on the behavior of adaptive networks is analyzed in greater detail else-
where [5]. To begin, we explore the scenario where all memberships are exclusive
(i.e., where each individual can only belong to a single group at a time), demonstrat-
ing that the NEG model exhibits comparable behavior to coevolutionary models
of opinions and culture. We then report three further sets of simulations: the ﬁrst
investigates the eﬀect of increasing the capacity of nodes such that they could belong
to more than one group simultaneously, but where all group costs are equal and all
node capacities are equal; the second and third sets of simulations consider the case
where group costs and node capacities respectively are heterogeneous. For each set
of experimental conditions, ten simulation runs were carried out, each consisting of
5× 106 time-steps.
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6.1. Exclusive groups
We begin by describing the base system behavior when group membership is exclu-
sive: that is, all individuals have a TAE capacity of one and all groups have a TAE
cost of one. Therefore, any individual initiating or joining a new group must ﬁrst
leave its current group. This corresponds to the situation found in many opinion
dynamics models (although the exact mechanisms used to modify node state and
edge location may diﬀer from model to model). Figure 1 shows the ﬁnal network
structure (with nodes shaded by group aﬃliation) and evolution through time of
group sizes.
Under these circumstances, the population evolves to what may be termed a
connected community structure. There is a strong overlap between the set of nodes
that share the same topological community and the set of nodes that share the same
group aﬃliation. However, the presence of a low level of random rewiring prevents
these clusters from disconnecting entirely, and allows the continued propagation
of group aﬃliation between communities. This continuing connectivity, combined
with the occasional initiation of novel groups maintains the population in a state
of dynamic equilibria: aggregate network level properties of the network stabilize,
while individual nodes continue to update their aﬃliation and neighborhood. The
group size plot in Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamic nature of groups: many groups are
initiated, some survive to grow and assume a dominant position in the population,
but even these are eventually overtaken and replaced.
6.2. Series A: Increasing individual TAE capacity
The ﬁrst set of simulations was used to investigate the eﬀect of increasing the
populations TAE capacity, such that individuals could belong to multiple groups
Fig. 1. An example network structure and group dynamic with exclusive group membership.
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simultaneously. Within a single simulation, all nodes had the same TAE capac-
ity (in the range [1, 5]) and all groups had a TAE cost of one. Two social net-
work properties were measured: Modularity quantiﬁes the extent to which the
social network exhibits community structure [31]. The measured values represent
the optimal partition identiﬁed by a community detection algorithm. A random
network typically displays a modularity value of approximately 0.3, and values
above this indicate the presence of signiﬁcant community structure. Mean social
distance (MSD) quantiﬁes the level of observed homophily in the population. MSD
is calculated as the mean of the social distances between neighboring individu-
als (i.e., along each edge of the social network). When individuals are randomly
distributed in a population, MSD is approximately 0.33; values below this indi-
cate that more edges are between individuals who are close in sociodemographic
space than would be expected in a random population. Three group level prop-
erties were measured: Group count is the number of live groups (i.e., containing
at least two individuals) at the end of the simulation run. Mean group size is the
mean size of live groups at the end of the simulation run. Mean group lifespan
is the mean age of all groups that have existed at any time during the simula-
tion run.
The simulation results indicate that increasing TAE capacity above one has
signiﬁcant eﬀects on network structure, observed homophily and group dynamics
(Fig. 2). The level of community structure decreases until it is comparable to that
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Fig. 2. Series A: Eﬀects of varying TAE capacity. All groups have a TAE cost of 1. Other
parameters as described in text. Error bars show ± 1 SD.
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of a random network of equivalent size and density [16]. However, while social ties
are distributed more homogeneously throughout the population for TAE capacity
above two, they are more likely to be between similar individuals. The combination
of these two trends suggests that as individuals belong to more groups, they are
less likely to become disconnected from the population, but have more opportu-
nity to leave groups containing individuals dissimilar to themselves. Unexpectedly,
although the theoretical limit on the number of possible groups increases linearly
with increasing TAE capacity, the number of groups observed increases more slowly.
After an initial jump from 29.6 to 71.9 groups as TAE capacity is increased from
one to two, the mean group count remains relatively constant between 61.9 and
83.7 as TAE capacity is further increased to ﬁve. Similarly, the mean size and
lifespan of observed groups increases non-linearly with increasing TAE capacity.
Two interesting points emerge. At higher capacities, the variance in group size
increases. Rather than a collection of roughly equal-sized groups, populations tend
to consist of a few larger groups and many smaller groups. Also, the similarity
between the shape of these two trends suggests that lifespan may be related to
group size.
6.3. Series B: Heterogeneous group TAE costs
A second set of simulations was used to investigate the eﬀect of heterogeneous
group TAE costs, such that some groups made greater demands on the time and
energy of their members than others. In these simulations, each time a new group
was initiated, it had an equal chance of having a TAE cost of one or two. Proper-
ties measured were as above; however, those pertaining to groups were measured
separately for each class of groups.
The simulation results indicate that, as may be anticipated, less costly groups are
maintained in the population in greater quantities than more costly groups (Fig. 3).
Similarly, the less costly groups are larger and survive longer. One less expected
observation is that the mean size of the more costly groups remains constant as
TAE capacity increases, while that of the less costly groups grows rapidly (more
rapidly, in fact, than was the case when all groups were of equal cost).
6.4. Series C: Heterogeneous individual TAE capacities
A ﬁnal set of simulations was used to investigate the eﬀect of heterogeneous indi-
vidual TAE capacities, such that some individuals have more time and energy to
allocate to group activities than others. In these simulations, each agent in a pop-
ulation had a TAE capacity drawn uniformly at random from the range [1, 5]. In
these simulations, all groups had a TAE cost of one. For these simulations, we also
measured node-level properties, including the degree centrality (normalized num-
ber of neighbors each node has) and betweenness centrality (normalized number of
shortest paths that each node lies on).
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Fig. 3. Series B: Eﬀects of heterogeneous group TAE costs. Each group has an equal change of
having a TAE cost of one (solid circles) or two (hollow squares). Other parameters as described in
text. Error bars show ± 1 SD. Note that TAE capacity ranges from two to ﬁve, and group count
ranges from zero to sixty; otherwise, axes are identical to corresponding plots in Fig. 2.
The simulation results indicate that, as anticipated, individuals with greater
TAE capacity, while initially distributed at random throughout the population,
came to occupy more central locations in the social network (Fig. 4). Other-
wise, there were minimal discernible diﬀerences in the population and group-level
behavior.
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Fig. 4. Series C: Eﬀects of heterogeneous TAE capacity. Each individual has an equal chance of
having a TAE capacity between 1 and 5. All groups have a TAE cost of one. Other parameters as
described in text. Error bars show ±1 SD.
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7. Discussion
Patterns of group aﬃliation and the structure of social ties in a population inter-
act in a non-trivial fashion. In this paper, we have explored the eﬀect of varying
levels of competition on the dynamics of group aﬃliation using a simple coevolu-
tionary model. By allowing individual nodes to belong to multiple groups, we have
moved beyond the type of exclusive group aﬃliation associated with existing opin-
ion dynamics and cultural evolution models. By altering the capacity of individuals
to belong to multiple groups, and the costs associated with group membership, we
have been able to explore interactions between social network evolution and group
aﬃliation dynamics under diﬀerent competitive conditions. In this section, we sum-
marize our observations of the NEG model behavior and relate them to back to
our theoretical concerns. We then describe a possible domain for a more concrete
instantiation of the model: the social networks connecting university students and
their aﬃliations with clubs and societies. Evaluating the current model from this
perspective, we suggest several ways in which the assumptions and design could be
reﬁned in future model designs.
Our observations may be summarized as follows:
• Reducing the level of competition between groups (Series A) reduces the level
of community structure observed in the social network and increases the level of
observed homophily. These changes may be related by the fact that decreasing
community structure increases the possibility of an individual being exposed to
groups to which they are more closely aligned in sociodemographic space.
• A greater number of larger and more long-lived groups are sustained by popula-
tions when competition is decreased (Series A). Most of these gains occur with
the initial removal of exclusive membership and further reductions in competition
have less impact on group properties.
• When groups have diﬀerent costs of aﬃliation (Series B), less costly groups are
maintained in greater numbers than more costly groups. When the level of compe-
tition is decreased, less costly groups experience more dramatic gains in number,
size and lifespan than more costly groups.
• When individuals have diﬀerent capacities for group aﬃliation (Series C), indi-
viduals with greater capacity come to occupy more central locations in the social
network.
What then are the implications of non-exclusive groups for social structure
and societal integration? In comparison to the scenario in which all groups are
exclusive, allowing multiple aﬃliations results in a more complex network structure
that is subject to conﬂicting forces. As the level of competition is decreased, the
population is less inclined to fragment into disconnected communities and network
structure becomes more topologically integrated. At the same time, the level of
observed homophily increases, suggesting that the greater range of available options
for association has actually reduced the level of sociodemographic integration.
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To make some of the ideas discussed in this paper more concrete, we evalu-
ate how the mechanisms embodied in the NEG model might play out in a real
domain. Consider the example of student society memberships in a typical uni-
versity. Students at a university have the opportunity to join and participate in
clubs and societies focused around shared recreational, political or social interests.
They learn about the existence of particular societies both through their social
contacts and via general advertising. Membership in societies involves attendance
at meetings or other society activities, which entail a time cost and which may
act as venues for the formation of new social contacts. The time and energy costs
of being involved in societies are likely to vary among societies and the amount
of time individuals are willing to devote to participation in society activities (as
opposed to, say, studying) is likely to vary among students. Over time, the pat-
terns of membership across societies will change, as some societies ﬂourish and
grow, others fade away and new societies are founded to address hitherto unmet
needs. Is it possible to characterize the organizational and structural attributes of
societies and predict which are likely to succeed? Similarly, the patterns of social
interaction between students will evolve over time [37, 29]. Students vary in terms
of their sex, age, ethnicity, academic program and other variables. What type of
social network structures emerge? Are these structures integrated or segregated? To
what extent (if any) can this structure be explained in terms of patterns of society
co-memberships?
On the basis of the results reported here, we may predict that less costly groups
may ﬁnd it easier to thrive, but that more costly groups may retain more diversity.
However, viewing the NEG model through the lens of the above example reveals
several limitations of the current set of assumptions. Here we discuss four speciﬁc
areas that warrant further attention: individual utility, group eﬃcacy, group iden-
tity and group structure. Regarding the ﬁrst two areas, the current model omits an
explicit description of both an individual’s utility function and a group’s eﬃcacy.
These are clearly important and related and will have a bearing on system dynam-
ics. Students deciding whether or not to join or leave a particular society will need
to weigh up the beneﬁts of membership against the costs incurred (including the
foregone opportunities to join other groups). A student’s assessment of membership
beneﬁts is likely to be inﬂuenced by the extent to which a group is achieving its
goals. In turn, group success is likely to be a more complex function of member-
ship and context than currently considered. Real groups must balance the cohesion
provided by intra-group ties with the access to resources and information provided
by inter-group ties [30]. Furthermore, the implications of groups with a ﬁnite, or
time-limited, goal remain to be explored. A richer deﬁnition of individual utility
could also enable a more principled approach to the initiation of new groups. Rather
than occurring at random, new societies are founded in response to the existence
of needs that are not met by currently existing societies.
The third potential area of model development is the deﬁnition of group identity.
In reality, not all groups are interchangeable and the exclusiveness of groups may
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apply only to other groups of the same type. For example, a student belonging to
a society representing a particular political party may be discouraged from joining
societies representing competing political parties, but not from joining societies
formed around sporting or musical interests (as in Ref. 8). The ﬁnal area is group
structure. While the NEG model does implicitly include group structure in terms
of the network of social ties between group members, it is interesting to consider
the implications this structure may have for group eﬃcacy on the one hand and
individual utility on the other: do some network structures make for more successful
groups than others? To what extent might an individual’s utility function be tied
to their status within a group?
It is apparent that there is much complexity present even in the relatively cir-
cumscribed domain of student societies. Other domains will impose further sets of
constraints on model deﬁnition. Much remains to be done in order to better under-
stand the relationship between social networks and group dynamics more generally.
Modelling competitive dynamics of non-exclusive groups represents an important
step forward and we believe our approach has considerable potential for future
development.
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